



The Time of the Self. A Feminist Reflection on Ricoeur’s Notion of Narrative Identity


Time affects the understanding of ourselves. Our bodies grow older and we adapt our prospects accordingly; our life experiences accumulate and influence our self-perception and self-definition. But not only our self-understanding, also the notion of “the self” itself incorporates time, i.e., includes constancy as well as change. My aim in this essay is to exemplify the notions of time that inhere in “the self”. I will start from the concept of the self that Paul Ricoeur develops in Oneself as Another (1992) – which explicitly builds upon the relationship between time and the self.
Ricoeur develops a narrative and ethical notion of the self that is characterised by a dialectics between sameness and self, idem and ipse.  In feminist theory, his thought is not considered very often,​[1]​ contrary to that of other continental thinkers in contemporary history, such as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Derrida, and also Husserl and Heidegger. To illustrate the relevance of his notion of the self, I will show how it is interrelated with time, and compare his “self” with the limits of narrative identity that Judith Butler develops in Giving an Account of Oneself (2005), and with Luce Irigaray’s notion of sexual difference.​[2]​ 

Time and the Self 

Personal identity in the philosophical tradition is often understood in terms of constancy, as that which remains the same. We understand personal identity not so much in terms of numerical identity (A=A), or qualitative identity (as in: person X and Y are wearing the same coat), but rather as the uninterrupted continuity between the first and last stages of development. Personal identity, in other words, refers to permanence in time. Ricoeur in Oneself as Another aims at a notion of permanence in time that not only makes the self understandable as something that remains relatively the same, but also as changing.​[3]​ For he does not consider the self to be identical: its experiences change; its self definition changes; its body changes over time. He claims that in order to understand this self we need a notion that incorporates both constancy and mutability. With the notion of narrative identity we have such a model for dynamic identity. For narrative identity mediates the extremes of the course of time: sameness and change.
Narrative identity includes the identity we grant to someone about whom we speak, as well as the identity that we call our own. It involves both the sameness that we refer to when we say of someone that he or she is one and the same person, and the self-same that we refer to in speaking of our own identity. In short, it pertains to the third-person as well as to the first-person perspective. The self-sameness of the self is worked out by Ricoeur as idem, sameness, or in French mêmeté; the “selfhood” as ipse, in French ipséité.​[4]​ Both idem and ipse are aspects of personal identity that stand in a dialectical relationship, and both in a different sense relate to permanence in time. Idem relates to constancy, to what remains the same; ipse is closer to change, yet also incorporates something that remains constant. In the next section, I will first work out the temporal consequences of the conception of the self as idem and as ipse. In these reflections, I understand the self in the first person perspective, i.e., as marker for designating ourselves. After that, I will turn to the temporality of the narrative.

Constancy and mutability: idem and ipse 
In contrast to philosophers who understand personal identity as that which remains the same, Ricoeur does not seek for a principle of permanence in time in the sense of “what”, but rather one that answers the question: who? “Is there a form of permanence in time that is a reply to the question ‘Who am I?’”, he asks.​[5]​ He finds that principle in a notion of narrative identity that expresses the dialectic between two models of permanence in time that we use in speaking about ourselves: character and keeping a promise. For Ricoeur, narrative identity forms the mediator between these two poles that both in different ways give articulation to permanence in time. The first one, character, is close to self constancy, and includes an almost complete overlapping of idem and ipse. Keeping one’s promise is closer to mutability and change, and implies the almost total irreducibility of idem and ipse to each other; it is the pole where “selfhood frees itself from sameness”.​[6]​ 
Character is “the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized”.​[7]​ It describes persons from the third person perspective, but we also use it to designate our own identity. It is something we do not choose, but to which we consent. In his earlier work, Ricoeur describes it under the heading of “the involuntary”, as opposed to voluntary decision.​[8]​ It forms the pole where idem and ipse coincide because it is “the same” of the self. 
Ricoeur works out the notion of character by associating the dispositions that make us recognize a person with the notions of habit and acquired identifications. Both elucidate the temporal nature of character. Habit points at the sedimented nature of dispositions, and clarifies why idem is central in character. Ipse, however, is not completely effaced because of the fact that my character does not coincide with me: my character is mine, but I am not (only) my character. There remains a dialectic between idem and ipse, but one in which ipse announces itself as idem. Acquired identifications show that the nature of character not only implies that we can be recognized by characteristics, but also that we recognize ourselves in them. There is an element of acquisition in identity and of internalization of characteristics that are ascribed to someone, or that someone ascribes to herself.
All together, character for Ricoeur designates the “what” of the “who”. It indicates one pole of the dialectic of idem and ipse that characterizes narrative identity, namely the pole in which the question “Who am I?” is answered by means of an answer to the question “What am I?” This answer is given in the form of a narrative, which has the advantage of preventing the complete and everlasting identification of the self with its character (because the narrative can be told differently on different occasions).
The other model of permanence in time that Ricoeur distinguishes is “keeping one’s word”. It expresses a self-constancy that can only be inscribed in the dimension of “who?”, and has nothing to do with the permanence of time that characterizes character. The self-constancy of the promise means that even though one’s opinions, values, desires, inclinations, and so forth, change – in other words, notwithstanding the fact that one is no longer the same - one does hold firm. The promise thus has nothing to do with the permanence of idem. Keeping one’s promise is described by Ricoeur as a challenge to time, a denial of change: “even if my desire were to change, even if I were to change my opinion or my inclination: ‘I will hold firm’”.​[9]​ As such, the promise indicates the split of idem and ipse, for at this end of the continuum there is no sameness anymore, only the constancy of the self that holds on to its promise.
Narrative identity forms the mediator between idem and ipse, between self sameness, where time forms a relative threat to identity because identity seems to fall apart in the course of time, and the promise, in which time is denied. Ricoeur distinguishes narrative identity from the self. The self is the reflexive subject that he aims at in the course of Oneself as Another.​[10]​ Narrative identity is the identity created in the life story. The self thus falls apart in the I that tells its life story and the protagonist of the story told. The first “I” is only expressible by the second, but will never be completely articulated. But the second, the narrative I, also runs across the limits of what is expressible, as we will see when we contrast Ricoeur with Butler. 
The self is thus, by means of its narrative, situated in the interval of idem and ipse. It is the constructed self of the I that tells its life story. This life story in itself also incorporates time.

The Time of the Narrative: Concordance and Discordance 
Ricoeur’s notion of personal identity not only includes time because it points out the dialectic between change and constancy, but also because it is in telling a narrative about ourselves that we acquire an identity. For Ricoeur the narrative is “the guardian of time”: “there can be no thought about time without narrated time”.​[11]​ “The narrative allows us a privileged mode of access to human time”, explains Kathleen Blamey.​[12]​ The narrative in all of its forms, from the novel to fairy tales and nonfiction genres such as historical accounts, biographies and chronicles, brings time to expression. In the case of telling the story of a life, the relationship between the recounted life and the narrative incorporates time in several ways. In the first place, the self can tell different stories about itself in the course of its life.
​[13]​ Thus, the narratives about one’s life can change over time. In the second place, the narrative itself is something that articulates time in such a way as “to give it the form of human experience”.​[14]​ Time is, Ricoeur says, “the referent of the narrative”. The narrative itself develops in time: it “uses” time, and also narrates about the progress of time. It is especially this last aspect that interests me here.
	The narrative about one’s life is a story that weaves a thread between specific events. In telling the story, we constitute the connectedness of our personal lives. The narrative places these events into a particular order. Ricoeur refers to the Aristotelian notion of “emplotment” to designate that order of events. For Aristotle, in the Poetics the plot forms the structuring and integrating process that gives an identity to the story. It is not a static structure, but a process that composes the story and makes it into a complete story that, in the end, can only be finished by the reader.​[15]​ 
	Ricoeur redefines the Aristotelian notion of emplotment as the synthesis between heterogeneous elements. That means in the first place that the plot synthesizes multiple events or incidents into one completed story. The events or incidents recounted are not simply occurrences, but receive a necessity because they form the elements that compose the progress of the narrative. Moreover, the story itself is not simply a serial or successive enumeration of the events, but connects them to each other in a specific way. Furthermore, the events, incidents and persons referred to among which the plot weaves a thread, are heterogeneous: planned and unplanned actions, coincidental or intended encounters, interactions ranging from conflict to collaboration, persons that suffer from actions, and persons that commit them, etc. The plot puts these heterogeneous elements into a dynamic unity that we, as readers or listeners, are able to follow. The heterogeneity of the events or incidents means that we can always ask: what happened then, and then, and then? This structure, that is typical for emplotment, means that the narrative is at once a discrete succession that is open and indefinite, and an integrated, closed, particular composition.
	With respect to time, the narrative contains both time as passing, flowing away, and time as enduring, remaining.​[16]​ It also includes time as discrete succession that is unfinished, and it integrates the various events and makes the succession of events into a configuration. The configuration contains the sort of time that endures: it is that which remains in the course of the events that pass away.
Thus, the specific model of the interconnection of events that emplotment constitutes integrates permanence in time with variability, discontinuity and instability. Ricoeur specifies the configuration that characterizes emplotment with the notions of concordance and discordance. Concordance refers to the principle of order “that presides over the arrangement of facts”; discordances are the reversals of fortune that make the plot of the story of one’s life “an ordered transformation from an initial situation to a terminal situation”.​[17]​ Thus, discordances disturb the unity of the plot; they threaten its identity. Ricoeur understands the narrative composition as a specific dialectic between both, i.e., as discordant concordance, which is similar to “the synthesis of the heterogeneous”. The result of this dialectic is that contingency and necessity become related, in other words, in one’s life story the contingent (i.e., the events which could have happened differently or which might not have happened at all) is incorporated into a larger configuration which makes it necessary or at least probable. The unity of one’s life story creates a necessary structure out of contingent events, in that way converting the contingent into what is necessary, or to be more precise, into a narrative necessity (which of course is not the same as a necessary event in one’s life).
Ricoeur thus understands narrative identity as the creation of a coherent life story, in which breaks within one’s life, for instance the death of a child or partner, or other traumatic events, are taken up into the story of one’s life. Indeed, discordant events such as these can sometimes be accounted for and articulated within language, and as such be woven into one’s life story. However, it is questionable whether they make the life story into a coherent one. Rather, they keep existing as breaks within the story. In other cases, for instance in a situation where a traumatic event is not recollected and (partly) escapes from memory, it remains unaccounted for, but nevertheless continues to exist within someone’s life as an influential and unarticulated event. Thus, the notions of “synthesis of the heterogeneous” and “discordant concordance” suggest a harmony of one’s life story that is illusory. The narrative notion of identity, and especially the centrality of the Aristotelian conception of emplotment, makes identity into a too harmonious category. For Ricoeur, even though discordances are part of the story and disturb the order, in the end they become part of the story. They are taken up and represented in the plot. The possibility for creating a unity out of a series of events for him lies in the fact that the story is partly based on fiction. We imagine the line that we draw between the events in our lives. Ricoeur understands narrative identity as that which integrates historical and fictional narrative. The narrative draws both on the events in one’s life and on fiction, thus “turning the story of a life into a fictional story or historical fiction”.​[18]​ Yet, in holding on to the centrality of the notion of “emplotment”, he gives priority to the creation of a coherent narrative.​[19]​
But there is more. Apart from not always being able to account for the events within one’s life, there is, in Judith Butler’s words, also “that in me and of me for which I can give no account”.​[20]​ In Giving an Account of Oneself, she points out that not everything about lives and experiences is narratable. She indicates the aspects which obstruct the coherence of the narrative and which show the limits of the possibility of narrating the self. Bodily experiences, for instance, are not precisely narratable; the unconscious is not explicitly part of our life story. Even though I can explain what I feel bodily, there is always a part of my bodily history of which I have no recollection, and to which I can not give a narrative form. The unconscious consists of the representations of the drives, phantasms, and imaginary scenes upon which the drive becomes fixated.​[21]​ It cannot be uttered (entirely), but influences our experiences, thoughts, feelings. Thus, the narrative that the self tells is limited: the self is never completely narratable. And the self that tells its life story cannot be completely identified, nor completely identify itself, with its life story. 

The Self and Its Character
With respect to time, the notion of narrative identity implies variability as well as constancy, and as such fits human self understanding. But for Ricoeur, the self that tells its life story does not necessarily coincide with the character in the narration. In “Life in Quest of Narrative” he explicitly addresses the question of the relationship between life (the I that narrates) and narrative (the character in the narrative). The relationship between both is exemplified, firstly, in the hermeneutical sense that the life story is only completed by its reader: “the sense or the significance of the narrative stems from the intersection between the world of the text and the world of the reader”.​[22]​ This implies that stories are not only recounted but also lived “in the mode of the imaginary”.​[23]​ Our life stories influence the sense of who we are. But also, for Ricoeur, life needs narration because it only exceeds being a biological phenomenon if it is interpreted. This means it is possible to narrate it because of its pre-narrative quality: life has a pre-narrative capacity; it is prefigured narratively. We understand action and passion through the entire network of expressions and concepts that are offered us in language. Human action is embedded within a semantics of action that makes it understandable. We thus understand our lives in the same sense as we understand narratives. Next, human action is symbolically mediated; it is articulated in “signs, rules, norms”.​[24]​ Ricoeur claims: 
“Our life, when then embraced in a single glance, appears to us as the field of a constructive activity, borrowed from narrative understanding, by which we attempt to discover and not simply to impose from outside the narrative identity that constitutes us.”​[25]​ 
We need to narrate who we are in order to understand ourselves. But that does not imply that our narrative identity and “self” overlap. Ricoeur exemplifies that we, firstly, are not the author of our life stories – which would be an argument for the overlap of self and narrative identity -, but co-author of its meaning. Secondly, “we need the help of fiction to organize life retrospectively”​[26]​ because of the elusive character of real life. Life exceeds narrative identity, but is also not recognizable and cannot be constructed without the narrative.​[27]​ 

The Body of the Narrative Self

Is the distance between the self and its narrative an effect of the embodiment of the self? Does the body, because it is not fully narratable, exceed narrative identity ensuring that the self and its narrative identity do not coincide? In this part of the essay I will claim that it is not the case that the body as some sort of constancy underlies the variability of the self. Even though bodily experiences are not completely narratable and the body thus exceeds narrative identity, in the end the structure of embodiment resembles the structure of the self and is only to a certain extent narratable.

Idem and ipse: Körper and Leib 
At first sight, it is tempting to associate the body with that which remains the same, in distinction to the self. The self then would be psychological or spiritual while the body would be material. But Ricoeur objects to identifications of the self with the psyche or mind, and the body with the constancy of the self. He writes that he does not want to enter into discussions like those in the analytical tradition over the best criterion for identity: psychological or corporeal.​[28]​ He does not associate the psychological criterion with ipse, and the corporeal criterion with idem. In other words, the idem-ipse distinction does not pertain to the body-mind split. For the body does not form the permanent part of our being. It does not even resemble itself: “One only has to compare two self-portraits of Rembrandt”, writes Ricoeur.​[29]​ Secondly, the body is not foreign to selfhood, and the reason for that is not that it is the remaining material side of the self, but rather that the self can claim: “this is my body”. The mineness of the body that Ricoeur assumes in following the phenomenologists forms “the most overwhelming testimony in favor of the irreducibility of selfhood to sameness”.​[30]​ The selfhood of the body is constituted by its belonging to someone who is capable of designating herself as the one whose body this is. Here we come across a double structure similar to that seen in the discussion of character: the body is the what of a who, and constitutes “who” this is.
Both aspects, the whatness and whoness of the body, go together with the two orders to which the body belongs: the order of things as well as the order of the self. In correspondence with Husserl, Ricoeur distinguishes two sorts of experience of the body: Körper and Leib. ​[31]​ For this distinction he departs from the Fifth Meditation of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations that addresses the question of the constitution of a shared nature, of an intersubjectively founded nature.​[32]​ Husserl introduces the distinction between Leib and Körper on the way from ego to other. Yet, otherwise than Husserl, in the Cartesian Meditations, with this distinction Ricoeur answers not to the objection of solipsism, but aims at showing the ontological passivity of the body, its openness for otherness.​[33]​
Husserl’s problem in the “Fifth Meditation” is how such a thing as a body is originally constituted in one’s experience. He discusses the primary awareness of my body that is presupposed by any external perception of it, namely as perceptual origin, as active, and as sensitive body. In order to understand the possibility of the constitution of another body with the same characteristics, he suggests that we perceive a likeness between the other body and our own. What the intersubjective constitution of nature obliges us to think, according to Husserl, is ourselves as Leib, before the constitution of the alter ego. Ricoeur concludes his reading of the “Fifth Meditation” by stating that Husserl considers what Ricoeur now calls “flesh” as implicating its own “proper” otherness. The otherness of the flesh precedes the otherness of the stranger. It consists in the “I can” that precedes any design and the will. “The flesh is the place of the passive syntheses on which the active syntheses are constructed…”, elucidates Ricoeur. “[I]t is the origin of all ‘alteration of ownness’”.​[34]​ 
Ricoeur wants to isolate this distinction between Leib and Körper from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and the problem of constitution, and claims that it is possible to do so. Only when the ontology of the flesh breaks free from the problematic of constitution that required it, can we think the body as at once my body, flesh, and as body among bodies. Whereas Ricoeur finds the mineness of the body to be missing in the analytical tradition, he concludes that Husserl has difficulties thinking the body as part of the world. Husserl has no answer to the question: “How am I to understand that my flesh is also a body?” Ricoeur here runs up against the limitations of phenomenology, at least in intending to derive the objective aspects of the world from a non-objectifying primordial experience. Husserl has difficulties in understanding the materiality of our own bodies (i.e., that they are Körper) on the basis of the solipsistic constitution of our bodies, and specifically perceiving external material objects (other bodies) as “like” our own.​[35]​ Husserl’s “solution” for the body to appear as body among bodies is to make the flesh part of the world (mondaneiser), writes Ricoeur. At that point the otherness of others as foreign is “interconnected with the otherness of the flesh that I am”, and “held in its way to be prior to the reduction to ownness”. Ricoeur elucidates:
“For my flesh appears as a body among bodies only to the extent that I am myself an other among all others, in the apprehension of a common nature, woven, as Husserl says, out of the network of intersubjectivity – itself, unlike Husserl’s conception, founding selfhood in its own way.”​[36]​ 
While Husserl faced difficulties in thinking the body as Leib and as Körper, Ricoeur, on the basis of Husserl’s meditations and unpublished manuscripts, claims that being Körper is as much part of selfhood as being Leib, and that the first is no less primordial than the latter.​[37]​ 
In understanding embodiment explicitly as being a body among other bodies, Ricoeur understands the body’s appearing in the world as of similar importance as self-intimacy and feeling one’s body are. As such, Ricoeur’s perspective on embodiment offers interesting leads for feminist theorizing. A strictly phenomenological account of embodiment, in which it appears as primordially one’s own, is limited from a feminist perspective.​[38]​ For a feminist account of embodiment should include a perspective on what it implies to be situated in the world. 
In the next part of this essay, I will further work out such a feminist account of embodiment with the help of Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler. But before going into that, a return to the self: for how does the body as Leib and Körper relate to the self? Earlier I mentioned that the body concerns the what of a who, and constitutes its whoness. I furthermore connected this distinction with Leib and Körper, implying that the whatness of the body coincides with its being Körper and its whoness with being Leib. Both aspects of embodiment are narratable, and thus can be part of narrative identity. We can recall bodily experiences, explain what we feel and how it feels, which are Leib-aspects; and we can objectify our body, speak about its characteristics, what it shares with others, in short, exemplify its Körper-aspects. What is articulable about, and is articulated of, the body can be a component of narrative identity, which thus incorporates its body. But the self cannot express its body entirely; for it also articulates itself by means of this same body upon which it does not reflect, but that shows itself in hesitations, slips of the tongue and emotions. And as mentioned before, not everything of the body is narratable. The body also exceeds narrative identity.

Irigaray’s Body as Relationship-With
Ricoeur, in claiming that being Körper is as much part of selfhood as being Leib, understands embodiment as being a body among other bodies as well as one’s own. As pointed out earlier, this is why Ricoeur’s perspective on embodiment offers interesting leads for feminist theorizing. For feminist notions of the body, just like Ricoeur’s, understand the body as lived experience, as well as body among other bodies, which implies among other things that the body receives social meanings, and is understood as the point where normative social structures cross. It at once situates the individual socially, and influences its self-perception. In this and the next section, drawing on both Irigaray’s and Butler’s later works, I will further work out this notion of the body. Both, from different angles, put Ricoeur’s notion of the embodied narrative self into perspective. Irigaray questions the sexual neutrality of Ricoeur’s account of embodiment, and Butler draws attention to the limits of narrativity and to the social normative context in which the narrative self tells its life-story. 
Luce Irigaray in To Be Two explicates a notion of the body that shows that embodiment allows us to participate in a community, and that emphasizes relationality. In some aspects, namely in considering embodiment as that which requires us to participate in the community of our genre,​[39]​ this notion resembles Ricoeur’s body among other bodies. In other aspects, it is very dissimilar, notably in sexualizing Ricoeur’s neutral account of embodiment. As I will show, Irigaray, by elucidating the sexually differentiated character of embodiment, brings in difference, and as such, enlarges the ethical potentiality that the notion of embodiment in Ricoeur’s account already has.
In a comment on Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas in To Be Two, Irigaray speaks of the body as at once subjectivity and objectivity. The subjectivity of the body can be associated with the body as Leib (which is translated by Sartre as “corps-sujet” – note that in this text Irigaray starts from Sartre). The body as objectivity (in Sartrian terms “corps-object”) is brought in relationship to gender, or in French, genre. Irigaray especially develops the objective side of embodiment in writing: 
“in so far as I belong to a gender, my body already represents an objectivity for me. […] Belonging to a gender allows me to realize, in me, for me – and equally towards the other – a dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity which escapes the dichotomy between subject and object”.​[40]​ 
In this passage, Irigaray aims at an alternative dialectics between subjectivity and objectivity than the one she envisions in the works of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.​[41]​ Embodiment already in itself incorporates a dialectics between subjectivity and objectivity for her. It is not because of the relationship to the other outside of us that we enter into a dialectics, but because of having and being a body itself. The body represents an objectivity because of belonging to a genre. 
In I Love To You Irigaray considers belonging to a genre in the context of the relationship between singularity and universality: 
“I belong to the universal in recognizing that I am a woman. This woman’s singularity is in having a particular genealogy and history. But belonging to a gender represents a universal that exists prior to me. I have to accomplish it in relation to my particular destiny.”​[42]​ 
One’s genre forms a universal that figures as a sort of horizon against which we can develop as particular beings. In belonging to a genre our body already incorporates the potential for its individual development, but it is still one that must be accomplished. Our identities thus should be developed in correspondence with our bodies. Irigaray claims “I am born a woman, but I must still become this woman that I am by nature”.​[43]​ One’s belonging to a gender helps the individual to develop itself according to the limitations and potentials that one’s genre includes.
The concept of “the negative in sexual difference” in I Love To You elucidates in what sense embodiment for Irigaray includes both limitations and potential: “The negative in sexual difference” means “an acceptance of the limits of my gender and recognition of the irreducibility of the other”.​[44]​ It makes us aware of the limit imposed on us by our genre, and it inscribes finiteness in embodiment because of belonging to a gender. Sexual difference represents a negative within each individual: “Being sexuate implies a negative, a not being the other, a not being the whole, and a particular way of being: tied to the body and in relationship with the other”.​[45]​ This limitation is not a restriction, but a constitutive or affirmative limit that helps us to develop into beings that realise their “perfection”. 
The development of a gender identity starts from recognizing that we belong to a gender, which entails being part of something that is larger than oneself, being part of a community, or “the universal” of one’s gender. Every individual has to accomplish that belonging in relation to her or his particular destiny. Irigaray, in this respect, also speaks of “accomplishing one’s gender’s perfection”.​[46]​ This is not an ideal that is similar for all women, but rather something that every woman (and every man) has to achieve by gathering her- or himself within her- or himself, and that every individual has to do for her- or himself. It is an individual task that everyone has to perform starting from her (or his) individual history and genealogy.
	For Irigaray, embodiment includes finiteness, or passivity. Her notion of passivity resembles Ricoeur’s passivity of the body in the sense that it allows us to participate in a community, and that it calls for an ethical attitude towards the other that is different from us. Ricoeur considers the body in Oneself as Another as one of three passivities that constitute the cogito as broken cogito – the other ones are the relationship to other people and our conscience. He distinguishes a triad of passivities, of phenomenological experiences of otherness, which relate to three ontological faces of otherness that are constitutive for the self. This triad ensures that the self can no longer be taken as self-foundational, and thus radically distances it from the Cartesian cogito, and gives way to a broken cogito. The triad consists of, firstly, “the passivity represented by the experience of one’s own body - or (…) the flesh” – as the mediator between self and world, secondly, “the passivity implied by the relation of the self to the foreign”, that is the other (than) self, and thirdly, “the most deeply hidden passivity, that of the relation of the self to itself, which is conscience”.​[47]​ Ricoeur does not aim at articulating the full range of possible experiences of otherness, but rather exemplifies three modes of passivity that confront the self with different alterities.
	Irigaray connects passivity to sexual difference: it includes respecting your body for what it is and respecting the other that is different from you. She ethically calls on us to take up the body’s passivity, include it in our sense of self, develop an identity accordingly, and to relate to others on the basis of this passivity. She, accordingly, sexualises Ricoeur’s neutral account of embodiment, and brings about difference. Whereas in Ricoeur’s perspective all bodies are similar to each other, or rather, differences between bodies are not accounted for; in Irigaray’s perspective the body is two, either male or female. Even though her naturalisation of sexual difference is questionable,​[48]​ I think it opens an enhanced ethical perspective on embodiment. In a sense, Irigaray further elaborates the body-notion that for Ricoeur, in his triad of phenomenological experiences of otherness, forms our “first” encounter with otherness.​[49]​ 
	Irigaray’s perspective on embodiment is not only ethical because she works out an attitude of relating to the finiteness of embodiment, and of developing one’s identity accordingly. More importantly, ethics for her includes a relationship to the other as not reducible to the self. Ethics implies recognition of the other’s transcendence.​[50]​ Her ethics is based on self-limitation, which implies acknowledging the gender of our bodies. Hence, it is an ethics built upon the phenomenological limitations that embodiment includes.
	Irigaray’s ethics is elucidated by the relationality that belonging to a gender implies for her. She claims that the gendered body is “relationship-with”. That means that “[i]n so far as I am a sexuate being, I represent a meaning for the other and I am, in a way, destined to him.” Embodiment as such implies relationships “with me”, “with my gender”, and “with the other gender”.​[51]​ Being sexuate in other words, implies that our bodies have a sexuate meaning, for ourselves, in describing to which part of humanity we belong and how we can accordingly develop ourselves, and for the other half of humanity which is different from us. If we relate to our genre as the negative and acknowledge the limitation that embodiment implies, we become aware of being part of only half of humanity, and can perceive the other (genre) as other (genre). In this way, sexual difference, which for Irigaray is the first difference we encounter familially, is the first encounter with difference. If we are able to deal with that, we are capable of engaging with other differences as well.​[52]​




While recognizing that embodiment implies objectivity as well as subjectivity and basing an ethics of self limitation upon that insight, Irigaray does not explicitly reflect upon the fact that it is within a social order that our bodies receive a sexuate meaning.​[53]​ The concepts “performativity” and “social existence”, that Judith Butler develops in Bodies That Matter (1993) and The Psychic Life of Power (1997), do indicate that, contrary to Irigaray’s thinking in which “nature” plays a part, subjectivity and embodiment receive their meaning in a social, normative context.
“Performativity” indicates the reiteration of a norm or set of norms that is cited. In the process of citation not only is the subject created as a social subject, but also its body receives its gendered significance. Regulatory norms for Butler “materialise”, and produce gender. She reformulates the concept of gender: it no longer implies the cultural significations  ascribed to the sexed body, but it includes the construction of that body as sexed. Thereby, Butler does not understand norms as socially stable, but shows the double constitution of norms and subject. Not only is the subject and its body constituted by citing dominant norms, but these norms themselves are installed because of being cited: “the norm of sex takes hold to the extent that it is ‘cited’ as such a norm, but it also derives its power through the citations that it compels”.​[54]​ The process by which the subject becomes a socially recognizable subject implies that it cites norms, and at the same time, by citing these norms, contributes to the dominance of those norms. Construction for Butler is not only taking place in time, but is itself a temporal process operating through the reiteration of norms.
The notion of “social existence”, in The Psychic Life of Power (1997), in an even more compelling way, shows that there is no subject prior to the norms that it cites, and that the subject brings its subordination to the norms to itself. The subject is both the “effect of a prior power”, and “the condition of possibility” for agency.​[55]​ As Butler elucidates, a specific temporality inheres in power: it is at once before the subject, and it creates the subject, and is thus present and takes a futural form (because the subject is its effect). Power is reiterated, and therefore the process of subordination in which the subject is constituted is dynamic. Butler further works out how norms operate as psychic phenomena, and do not only govern the formation of the subject, but also circumscribe the domain of a liveable sociality. In this way, she persuasively reveals the power structures that are part of the social domain and that exclude some and include others as viable subjects.
The performativity of subjectivity and the subject’s social existence imply that self understanding, or in Ricoeur’s words, self interpretation, is not based upon introspection, but arises within a social context that prescribes who is a recognizable subject and who is not. It means that our life story is not so much constituted by us, but rather is constituted in advance by that which is socially understandable. Consequently, we do not “own” our life story, but it is principally addressed.
Butler, in Giving an Account of Oneself (2005),​[56]​ explicitly shows that the story of our life, narrative identity, is embedded within normative societal structures. Narrating the self takes place under conditions. She claims that the narrative self, the “I” that tells a story “can only tell it according to recognizable norms of life narration”.​[57]​ Telling the story of a life is not something we do outside of a context, but there is a “you” – which can also be imaginary – that is addressed in the story. She says: “if I can address you, I must first have been addressed, brought into the structure of address as a possibility of language before I was able to find my own way to make use of it.”​[58]​ This is not only so because language belongs to the other, and I do not choose the language that is my own, but because telling a story means being addressed by the other. Before articulating myself, I am already spoken to by that which differs from me. Prior to my individuation, I am addressed by another. Otherness is installed in the subject even before it is able to give an account of itself, that is, before telling its life story.
	Also to Ricoeur the thought that we are addressed and conditioned by otherness is not strange. As already indicated, he understands the self as symbolically mediated. The narrative self is, as he writes, “instructed by cultural symbols”.​[59]​ It is in language and culture that we narrate our life stories, and the cultural symbols that are available to us for a large part determine how the story is told. The mediation of the self by cultural signs implies at once that the self does not have immediate access to itself, and that the self as that which we understand ourselves to be, is not constant, but subject to change. The self is not only subject to change because it is can tell a different life story in different periods of its life, but also because the available language and culture from which it draws are engaged in processes of transformation. Cultural mediation means that narrative identity is not “ours”, so that the self does not know itself, but can only interpret itself. Like Butler, Ricoeur thus understands the self as passive, and interrupted by the other. But unlike Butler, he does not think through the social and political consequences for the “self” of this interruption by the other, of the address of the other. 
Butler does make us aware of the consequences of the notion of narrative identity that are connected with its being articulated in a language that belongs to the other. Firstly, norms condition what counts and does not count, as a recognizable account of oneself. Every account of myself must in some way or another conform to norms that govern “the human recognizable”.​[60]​ This means that in articulating myself I am always addressing the other, and that I am constituting myself as address of the other. Secondly, Butler points out that not everything of our life and experience is narratable. As indicated earlier, Butler questions the coherence of the life story, and exemplifies the limits of the possibility of telling one’s life story, such as bodily experiences, as well as the unconscious. In this way, she not only points out that there are white spaces in the story, margins and missing links, but draws the radical consequences of the dispossession of one’s life story:
“If I try to give an account of myself, if I try to make myself recognizable and understandable, then I might begin with a narrative account of my life. But this narrative will be disoriented by what is not mine, or not mine alone.”​[61]​

Conclusion: The Time of The Embodied Self
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